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Compelling Expert Testimony: A Proposed Statutory
Reform
By Richard A. Patch*
The complexity of issues in many modem civil' cases requires that
courts have reliable expert assistance. Indeed, expert testimony is re-
quired as a legal necessity to maintain some actions and as a practical
necessity in many others. 2 The expert witness, consequently, occupies
a unique and controversial role in the modem judicial system. Much
of the controversy results from the expert's 3 inability to satisfy the con-
flicting demands of the court and the adversary. Courts expect the
expert to provide guidance in the determination of highly technical is-
sues. The adversary, however, having paid for the services of the ex-
pert, expects to receive a favorable, partisan presentation. The expert,
consequently, has been the subject of extensive commentary and legis-
lation purporting to reconcile this anomaly. No reform suggested by
the commentators or attempted by the legislatures, however, has recon-
ciled successfully the competing interests involved in litigation which
requires expert testimony.
This Note asserts, through a comparative history, that the expert
has a legal duty to the courts analogous to that of the ordinary witness.4
A statute is proposed to implement this duty.5 The Note argues that
enactment of the proposed statute would best ensure an effective mod-
em civil adjudicatory system.6
* B.A., 1975, University of California, Santa Barbara. Member, Third Year Class.
1. This Note will consider the role of the expert witness in civil litigation only. A
court's ability to compel the testimony of expert or ordinary witnesses in criminal actions
raises constitutional issues distinct from the purpose of this Note. For a discussion of the
constitutional right to compulsory process in criminal actions, see United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
2. See notes 59-62 infra.
3. It is assumed thoughout this Note that "expert witness" refers to a person qualified
to give expert testimony. For a review of such qualifications, see 31 AM. JUR. 2d, Expert
and Opinion Evidence § 26 (1967); MCCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
13 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
4. See notes 24-27 & accompanying text infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 70-73 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 93-102 infra.
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Comparative History: The development of the ordinary and the
expert witness
Comparison of the development of the role of the expert witness to
the development of the role of the ordinary witness demonstrates that
each has followed a remarkably parallel analytical pattern of growth.7
Comparison also demonstrates that when problems similar to those
confronting the expert witness today threatened the continuing vitality
of the ordinary witness, the English Parliament successfully resolved all
conflicts by creating a duty whereby every citizen must testify when
properly summoned.
8
The Development of the Ordinary Witness
Permissive Use of the Testimony of the Ordinary Witness
There is little evidence of the first actual appearance of the ordi-
nary witness, however, it is generally agreed that use of oral testimony
was common by the early seventeenth century.9 "This relatively late
appearance of oral evidence in the common law, was due to the firm-
ness with which the common law adhered to the view that the jurors
were as much witnesses as judges of fact."10 The common law did,
however, make use of "preappointed witnesses,"' 1 who, unlike the
modern ordinary witness "did not supply evidence upon which the
court could decide,"'12 but simply swore an oath attesting to their belief
in the plaintiffs claim or the genuineness of a deed or transaction in
dispute. The function of the preappointed witnesses was rigidly de-
fined.' 3 Beyond resort to the preappointed witnesses who deliberated
with the regular jurors, 14 further attempts by litigants to influence the
7. Exact temporal continuity of the developing roles of the ordinary and the expert
witness is irrelevant to the approach taken herein.
8. See notes 24-30 & accompanying text infra.
9. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 62 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 8 WIG-
MORE]; 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 178 (1926) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 9 HOLDSWORTH].
10. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 131.
11. "Preappointed witness" is a term adopted from Holdsworth. See 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 9, at 177. The three major types of preappointed witnesses were: (I) the secta,
who swore to their belief in plaintiff's claim; (2) the deed witnesses, who swore to the genu-
ineness of the document they had signed; and (3) the transaction witnesses, who swore to the
occurence of the transaction they witnessed. Id. at 178.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 63. The preappointed witnesses were originally
called along with the jurors. It was only as their numbers became impractical that they
were summoned separately. Id.; 9 Holdsworth, supra note 9, at 179.
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jury were unwelcomed by the courts.'5 Indeed, a person who volun-
teered information to the jury was vulnerable in an action for the crime
of maintenance.' 6 Oral evidence was only permitted as a means of
impeaching the jurors.
17
By the seventeenth century, exclusion of oral evidence was, how-
ever, "fast ceasing to correspond with the more advanced juridical
needs and ideas of the time,"' 8 because "the jury was less and less able
to do justice to the cause through the means of its own neighborhood
knowledge."19
Compelling the Testimony of the Ordinary Witness
When oral evidence was first introduced it was inconceivable that
anyone could be compelled to testify.20  This attitude was a direct re-
sult of the limitations inherent in the concept of the preappointed wit-
nesses. Courts compelled witnesses only when the testimony coincided
with an existing category of the preappointed witnesses.2' Thus, the
first witnesses compelled by the courts were the "deed witnesses" who
by affixing their signatures to the document had agreed to testify.22 As
late as 1455, however, it was said that "no one can compel another to
swear with him."23
Prompted by developments in the law, the need to compel the at-
tendance of witnesses became critical. As the jury lost its dual func-
15. The first witnesses introduced by the litigants were considered "meddlers" by the
courts. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 64.
At this time the jury continued to function in its dual capacity of trier and witness. The
courts persisted in the belief that the jury's source of information was not a proper subject of
inquiry. Irregular methods of influencing and intimidating the jury were common. See, 9
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 181-182.
16. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 65; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 182; 3 HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 9, at 649.
17. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 183.
18. Id.
19. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2190. The recognition that the jury was unable to
function properly without the aid of the ordinary witness is fundamentally parallel to the
present status of the expert witness. The judiciary's power to compel testimony is equally as
appropriate for the pretent problem as it was for the former. See text accompanying notes
57-69 infra.
20. Id. In an early case (1291) when the King attempted to compel the testimony of
certain magistrates "all of them asserted that it was thing unheard of that they should be
compelled to swear." 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 179-80.
21. See note 11 supra. The preappointed witnesses had provided mere assertory oaths
as opposed to testimony under oath. The courts would compel ordinary witnesses, there-
fore, only where by their actions or signature they had consented to be called. 9 HOLDS-
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tion, the law grew to require testimony to maintain certain actions,24
and the injustice to a party who was unable to compel attendance of
witnesses became apparent. Moreover, there was concern that the
close relationship of the party and the witness often resulted in over-
zealous and coercive testimony.2 5 Finally, witnesses continued to suf-
fer under the threat of an action in maintenance if the party for whom
they had testified should fail in the controversy. 26 In response to these
developments and continuing concerns Parliament passed the Act of
1562-63.27
The Act of 1562-63, insofar as it pertained to witnesses, was based
on the new, fundamentally different premise that every citizen had a
duty to testify when summoned.28 The recognition of this duty pro-
tected the interests of both the litigant and the witness, for "what a man
does by complusion of law can not be called maintenance." 29 The
duty to testify represented a revolutionary change in the concept of the
witness' role. The demand to testify did not come from a particular
party, but rather "from the community as a whole-from justice as an
institution and from law and order as indispensible elements of civi-
lized life."'30
Having recognized the duty to testify, Parliament and the courts
could freely fashion new rules specifically designed to protect the com-
peting interests of the court, the litigants, and the witnesses.3' The Act
of 1562-63 contained two important innovations that have remained
part of the law. First, the offense of perjury was created to provide the
courts with a method of exerting direct control over testimonial relia-
bility.32 Second, witness fees were initiated in order to reduce the
magnitude of the imposition on the witness. 33 Since the Act of 1562-
63, a vast body of law has grown around the ordinary witness. Courts
24. Id. at 185. The obvious example of such actions was the criminal charge of trea-
son which, by law required the testimony of two witnesses.
25. See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
26. The threat of liability for maintenance resulting in the unavailability of needed
testimony was a critical factor in prompting legislative reform. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 9, at 182; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, at 65.
27. 5 ELIZ. I, c. IX (1562).
28. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 185. To implement this change Parliament
adopted the "subpoena" which had been used effectively by the Chancery courts for over a
century. Id.
29. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2190.
30. Id. § 2192.
31. For a discussion of the early development of rules governing compulsion and com-
petency, see 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 177-203.
32. 5 ELIZ. I, c. IX, § 1 (1562).
33. 5 ELIZ. I, c. IX, § XII (2) (1562). See also PhiUler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis.
211, 216, 120 N.W. 829, 831 (1909) (discussing the fees provision of the Act of 1562-63).
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have defined competency 34 and relevancy, have created exemptions
and privileges,35 and have recognized exceptions to the duty to testify
36
in an effort to adjust inequities.
The Expert Witness
Early in the development of the role of the ordinary witness the
courts confined the scope of admissible testimony to facts within the
actual knowledge of the witness to the exclusion of any opinions or
inferences. 37 Yet, as early as the fourteenth century the courts recog-
nized that the opinion of an expert was admissible as an exception to
the rule.3 8 The first expert witnesses were called exclusively by the
courts and were "regarded as expert assistants to the court. ' 39 Their
status as court officials permitted the introduction of the opinion
testimony.
Permissive Use of Expert Testimony
Expert testimony was not used extensively until the seventeenth
century when juries had come to rely commonly on oral evidence.
40
By then, however, the expert witness had evolved from court officer to
adversary witness. 41 In addition, the concept of expert testimony had
expanded to include not only the formal professions but the newly de-
veloping areas of science as well.42 Some conservative courts voiced
34. See generally, MCCORMICK, supra note 3, §§ 61-7 1.
35. Id. §§ 72-143.
36. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, §§ 2204-2207.
37. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 211; MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 11. The origi-
nal opinion rule excluded only conjecture not based on observation in contrast to the
broader present day rule which forbids inferences and impressions. See Note, The Opinion
Rule in California and Federal Courts:.A Liberal Approach, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 233, 234-36
(1976) (discussing the different categories of the term "opinion").
38. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 212.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Note, The Opinion Rule, in Cal//ornia and Federal Courts: A Liberal
Approach, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 233, 241 (1976).
41. See Exparte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 395-97 (1875) (quoting extensively from OR-
DRONEAUX, JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDICINE 138 (1869)).
42. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 212. The history of the handwriting expert
illustrates the courts' early reluctance to permit expert testimony. When first introduced in
the 17th century, comparative handwriting analysis was permitted only if the "expert" had
actually seen the person write so that the "expert" testimony was merely corroborative. By
the 18th century the testimony remained merely corroborative, but it was recognized that
handwriting experts could form an opinion from sources other than personal observation.
In the early 19th century the courts freely admitted the testimony of persons who knew the
handwriting in question but excluded any opinions based solely on comparison. It was only
when the legislature acted that testimony based purely on a comparative analysis was openly
admitted. Id. at 212-14 (citing 17 & 18 VicT. c. 125, § 27 (1854)).
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their distrust of expert testimony.4 3 Most courts, however, merely be-
gan to scrutinize the expert's qualifications more strictly and to narrow
the permissible subjects of expert testimony." With the arrival of the
adversary expert the court-appointed expert became rare.
In addition to questions regarding permissibility and propriety of
expert testimony, the courts were confronted with a concern unique to
the role of the expert witness. Expert witnesses demanded compensa-
tion for their professional services in addition to the compensation pro-
vided the ordinary witness. The courts responded with varying
degrees of sympathy,4 5 but avoided complete resolution of the issue. 6
The problem was unnecessarily complicated by the "custom amongst
English courts to treat physicians and lawyers as exempt from coerced
attendance on the same terms as other witnesses. '47 The English rule,
however, was not followed in most American jurisdictions. 48 Many
cases have treated compensation of expert witnesses as an issue inextri-
cably intertwined with the court's ability to compel expert testimony.
49
The issue of compensation, therefore, will be examined in relation to
the court's power to compel expert testimony.
43. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 65 Me. 74, 76 (1876) (referring to expert testimony as
"the vain babblings and oppositions of science falsely so called").
44. See MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 29-31 (present day standards); 31 AM. JUR. 2d,
Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 26-32 (1967).
45. See LAWSON, THE LAW OF THE EXPERT AND OPINION TESTIMONY 261-64 (1886)
for cases recognizing the expert's property interest. The leading case on the property value
of an expert's knowledge is Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918).
The English rule, adopted by the Pennsylvania court, is stated in Webb v. Paige, I Car. &
Kir. 23 (1843). But cf. Dixon v. People 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Buchman v. State,
59 Ind. 1 (1877); Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S.W. 121 (1907) (providing
only for ordinary compensation for expert testimony).
46. The courts' failure to resolve completely the professional's compensation problem
is evidenced by the continuing dissatisfaction of such witnesses. See Byrd, Knowledge for
Sale-The Dilemma of the Expert Witness, 6 TRIAL, May 1976, at 59, 61 (suggesting some
additional guidelines); Note, Contingent Feesfor Expert Witness in Civil Litigation, 86 YALE
L.J. 1680, 1685-88 (1977); Note, The Contingent Compensation of Expert Witnesses in Civil
Litigation, 52 IND. L.J. 671 (1977).
47. Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 215, 120 N.W. 829, 830-31 (1909). See
also Kraushaar Bros. & Co., Inc., v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1946) (following
the English rule).
48. See, e.g., Exparte Dement, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); Flinn v. Praire County, 60 Ark. 204,
29 S.W. 459 (1895); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Lee, 3 Colo. App. 177, 3 P. 841 (1893); Dixon v.
People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S.W.
121 (1907).
49. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2203 (stressing that the question is not just
whether the expert deserves larger compensation, but whether the expert is subject to com-
pulsory process if no prior arrangement for compensation has been made). See also An-




When expert testimony was originally introduced, it was incon-
ceivable that any expert could be compelled to testify. 50  Differences
perceived by courts between the expert and the ordinary witness5I
made it impossible to compel the expert under prevailing concepts of
the power of the subpoena. The courts considered the availability of
expert testimony as essentially a matter of contract between the expert
and the party.5 2 As the need for expert testimony increased, the courts
abandoned this early position and compelled the testimony of experts,
but only to the extent the expert could be considered an ordinary wit-
ness.53 Consequently, the first experts compelled were treating physi-
cians who had observed some facts relevant to the pending controversy,
notwithstanding that the facts were perceptible only to the trained
eye.54 In addition, the concept of "facts" or "actual knowledge" grad-
ually expanded to encompass previously formed expert opinions.55 No
50. "[T]he private litigant has no more right to compel a citizen to give up the product
of his brain, than he has to compel the giving up of material things." Pennsylvania Co. v.
Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 442, 105 A. 630, 631 (1918).
5 1. "There is a distinction between the case of a man who sees a fact, and is called to
prove it in a court of justice, and that of a man who is selected by a party to give his opinion
about a matter with which he is particularly conversant from the nature of his employment
in life." Exparte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 392 (1875). This difference is the basis for much of
the controversy surrounding the role of the expert witness and the fundamentally different
treatment of the expert and the ordinary witness.
52. Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 442, 105 A. 630, 631 (1918). ("in
each case it is a matter of bargain"); Kraushaar Bros. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d
165 (1946); Hull v. Plume, 131 NJ.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944); Philler v. Waukesha County,
139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); LAWSON, THE LAW OF EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE
262 (1886) ("[i]t being purely [a] matter of conventional arrangement between professional
experts and those who desire to employ them as witnesses, both in regard to their acting as
such, and also their making preparation to enable them to give such testimony").
53. Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1182, 1184-87 (1961). "A physician who has acquired knowl-
edge of a patient or of specific facts in connection with a patient may be called upon to
testify to those facts without any compensation other that the ordinary witness receives for
attendance upon court." City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d
227, 234, 231 P.2d 26, 29 (1951).
54. City and county of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26
(1961); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1182, 1184-87 (1961). See also Board of County Comm'rs v.
Lee, 3 Colo. App. 177, 32 P. 841 (1893); Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 933, 67 P.2d 416, 418
(1937) (radiologist compelled: "[t]he expert is not asked to render professional services as a
physician or chemist or engineer, he is asked merely, as other witnesses are, to testify what
he knows or believes"); Mount v. Welch, 118 Or. 568, 247 P. 815 (1926); Note, Requiring
Experts to Testi)' in Maine, 20 ME. L. REV. 297, 300-02 n.19 (1968) (collecting cases).
55. In a recent federal case, Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976), Judge
Friendly upheld the lower court's refusal to quash the subpoenas of two computer consul-
tants on the basis that their previously formed opinions constituted relevant information.
The case is unique in two respects. First, the United States government was the plaintiff in
a civil antitrust action from which the motions to quash arose. See United States v. I.B.M.
Corp., 406 F. Supp. 178 (1976). Second, compensation for the consultants had been guaran-
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jurisdiction to date, however, has been willing or able to compel the
expert where preparation or examination is required to enable the ex-
pert to form an opinion.
56
The Parallel
The present treatment of expert witnesses has caused the courts,
legislatures, and commentators to recognize the need for reform,57 but
none has recognized the remarkable resemblance of the modem con-
cerns surrounding the expert witness and the ancient concerns sur-
rounding the ordinary witness immediately preceding the sweeping
reforms of the Act of 1562-63.58
Expert testimony is now required by law to maintain certain
causes of action 59 and is practically indispensable in many others.60 It
is unfair to a party that a cause of action be allowed to flounder be-
cause of an expert's refusal to testify.61 The jury, as a result of the
teed. 539 F.2d at 813. Judge Friendly took the opportunity to discuss, in general terms, the
court's power to compel expert testimony, 539 F.2d at 821-22, causing great concern to
Judge Gurfein. 539 F.2d at 822-24. See generally Note, Compelling Experts to Testfy. A
Proposal, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 854 (1977) (discussing current approaches).
56. See Annot. 77 A.L.R.2d 1182, 1189 (1961).
57. See Holschuh, Advocacy in the Preparation and Presentation of Medical Evidence,
21 OHIO ST. L.J. 160 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Holschuh]; Markus, Conspiracy ofSilence,
14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 520, 532-33 (1965); Ordover, Expert Testimony.A Proposed Codefor
New York, 19 N.Y.L.F. 809 (1974); Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony.A Way to Better and
Quicker Justice, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Peck]; Note, Requiring Experts
to Testify in Maine, 20 M. L. Rev. 297 (1968); Note, Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses in
Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J. 1680 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Contingent Feesfor Expert
Witnesses]. The court's reaction has been to assert its authority to call impartial experts.
Annot. 95 A.L.R.2d 390, 391-94 (1964); 31 AM. JUR., Expert and Opinion Evidence § 8
(1967). See also, Note, The Trial Judge's Use of His Power to Call Witnesses, 51 Nw. U.L.
REv. 761 (1957); Note, JudicialAuthority to Call Expert Witnesses, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 375
(1957). The legislatures have reacted by promulgating statutes that affirm the court's power
to appoint impartial experts. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ (West
1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS 9 - 17-19 (Supp. 1976); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE § 706 (1974).
58. See notes 24-26 & accompanying text supra.
59. For example, expert testimony is required in some malpractice actions. See, e.g.,
Oleksiw v. Weidener, 8 Ohio App. 2d 199, 195 N.E.2d 813 (1964); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. 2d 89, 95, 199 P.2d 302, 307 (1948).
60. "The use of experts in litigation has become almost a fixture in many ar-
eas-antitrust, condemnation, desegregation, malfunction and defects in design in products
liability...." Note, The Contingent Compensation of Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation,
52 IND. L.J. 671, 686-87 (1977). See also 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 212-14; Fore-
man, How to Choose and Use Plaintff/'s Experts, 12 FORUM 155, 156 (1976) (expert testi-
mony required in most aviation accident cases).
61. Courts have refused to compel requested expert testimony and subsequently enter a
directed verdict or nonsuit because the cause of action cannot otherwise be established. See,
e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974)
(medical malpractice). As to the extent of the problem, see Note, Compelling Experts to
Testfy. A Proposal, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 853-59 (1977); Starks, Is It Error to Discuss
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increasingly complex nature of modem litigation, is unable to function
properly without the aid of experts.62 In addition, great concern has
been expressed regarding the close relationship between the party and
the expert and the resulting overzealous, partisan testimony.63 Finally,
there is concern over the absence of an adequate procedure to compen-
sate the expert who, in many jurisdictions, is entitled only to ordinary
witness fees."
When similar concerns threaten the utility of the ordinary witness,
Parliament successfully resolved them by recognizing that every citizen
owed a duty to testify when properly summoned.6 5 Underlying Parlia-
ment's action was the realization that the role of the ordinary witness
should be defined by the needs of the courts and the public and not
merely by the needs of an individual litigant.6 6 The duty to testify and
the court's ability to compel testimony ensured an effective civil adjudi-
catory process at minimal cost to the public.
The parallel assumption, that the expert has a duty to testify when
specific expert evidence is necessary to a proper adjudication of an ac-
tion, has not been accepted by the courts or legislatures nor suggested
by the commentators. Many of the professed solutions still consider
that the issue is governed exclusively by the needs of the party.
67
Other reforms, attempting to protect the interest of the court in ob-
taining reliable expert testimony, have ignored the parties' interests.
6 8
Because all reforms suggested or enacted to date have been designed to
resolve only one or two narrow issues within the total controversy sur-
rounding the role of the expert witness, none has fully reconciled the
Conspiracy of Silence in a Malpractice Trial?, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. RaV. 534, 540-41 n.32
(1965).
62. "In the context of our complex modem industrial society the need for expert assist-
ance in resolving complicated disputes is readily apparent." Ordover, Expert Testimony: A
Proposed Code for New York, 19 N.Y.L.F. 809, 809 (1974).
63. Peck, supra note 57, at 22-23; Holschuh, supra note 57, at 173.
64. See note 54 & accompanying text supra. Many states have provided for compen-
sation of experts in an amount in excess of ordinary witness fees. See Note, Compelling
Experts to Testfy:.A Proposal, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 851, 856 n.18 (1977) (collecting relevant
statutes).
65. See notes 27-30 & accompanying text supra.
66. See note 28 & accompanying text supra.
67. See, ag., Note, Requiring Experts to Testfy' in Maine, 20 M. L. REv. 297 (1968)
(proposed statute addressed entirely to the expert and litigant's inability to arrive at a satis-
factory contract). The use of contingent fees to reimburse expert witnesses who testify on
behalf of indigent litigants is widely prohibited but is suggested as a remedy to the indigent's
problem. See, Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses, supra note 57; Note, 1977 Wis. L. REv.
603 (1977).
68. Court appointment of experts is explicitly designed to avoid the problems of the
adversary expert.
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variety of competing interests involved.69
Proposed Reform
The success of the Act of 1562-63, regarding the testimony of ordi-
nary witnesses, can be repeated by a statutory resolution of the present
controversy surrounding the expert witness. The same fundamental
change in approach is required. The following proposed statute incor-
porates the duty to testify and the language and concepts of existing
statutes70 in an attempt to implement this fundamental change. The
proposal is intended to be representative of the kind of statute needed
to accomplish adequate reform in the law. It is not intended to be the
definitive resolution, but it does indicate the different provisions which
should be included in any such attempt.
The Statute
i.) Upon motion by any party to an action asserting that testimony
by an expert on the facts involved would be of material aid to
the just determination of the pending controversy the court
shall subpoena the experts selected by the parties.
ii.) Any person so subpoenaed who is subsequently required to
testify; or who is required to attend the taking of his or her
deposition; or who has been required to stand ready to testify;
and who is qualified as an expert witness shall be entitled to
expert witness fees
[Alternative I:] as provided by section
[Alternative II:] as set by the court on a per diem per mile
basis.
Said fees shall be tendered by the party calling the expert and
shall be charged thereafter in like manner as other costs.
iii.) In addition to the fees provided by subsection (ii), any expert so
called shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for any
preparation, examination, or inspection required to enable that
expert to formulate an opinion or interpretation on the matter
in issue, whether required by the party calling the witness in
preparation for trial or as a basis for the expert's testimony at
trial. The sum shall be fixed by the court at pretrial conference
and paid by the party requesting that such preparation, exami-
nation, or inspection be made. In fixing the amount to be
charged the court shall consider:
a.) Any agreement between the party and the expert, but the
court shall not be bound thereby;7' and,
69. See notes 80-93 & accompanying text infra. Other legislative reforms, such as stat-
utes providing for expert witness fees, are obviously narrow.
70. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (1974); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 730-33 (West 1966);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5 (West 1976); FED. R. EVID. 706.
71. This factor recognizes the need to permit litigants and counsel to agree to pay an
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b.) The fees normally charged by an expert of like stature in
the profession, trade, or calling;72 and
c.) The ability of the party to pay.
73
iv.) Should any expert so subpoenaed be unwilling to respond, the
court shall, upon motion to quash, refuse to compel the expert
only if the court's interest in arriving at a just resolution of the
pending controversy can be adequately assured without requir-
ing the attendance and services of the expert selected by the
party.
v.) Nothing in this statute is intended to limit the court's ability to
call an expert of its own selection.
The Effects of the Proposal
The provisions of the proposed statute will relieve the controversy
surrounding the expert witness by adopting the advantages of both the
court-appointed expert and the adversary expert. Consequently, the
chief merit of the proposal is not the resolution of any particular issue
or conflict, but is rather the reconciliation of all the competing interests
involved in litigation requiring expert testimony to insure an effective
civil-adjudicatory system. The goals of an effective civil adjudicatory
system may be summarized as follows:74  (1) access to the judicial
system; 75 (2) encouragement of settlement;76 (3) deterrence of frivo-
lous claims;77 and (4) promotion of testimonial reliability.78 Each of
these goals is a step towards the attainment of the ultimate
goal-truth. 9 The achievement of an effective modem civil adjudica-
expert the sums he or she requests where cooperation is essential. But cf. note 102 & ac-
companying text infra (experts may still slant reports).
72. Experts who are renowned in their field should be awarded greater compensation
to deter litigants from summoning the most eminently qualified experts where their high
quality assistance is not necessary.
73. Consideration of this factor maximizes access to the courts. See note 95 & accom-
panying text infra (only genuine inability to pay will influence fees set by courts.).
74. The goals of an effective modem civil adjudicatory system used in this Note were
derived from Contingent Fees/or Expert Witnesses, supra note 58.
75. Equal access to the courts is not a constitutional right in the context of civil litiga-
tion. If, however, access is denied by monetary barriers and the court provides the oniy
forum for redress, then due process is denied. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374
(1971). Boddie has been strictly limited to cases where the court holds a monopoly on the
means of redress. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,435-36 (1973). The Court's decision
in Boddie, however, affirmed that access to the judicial system is a major concern. See
Note, 1977 WIs. L. REv. 603, 603-09 (1977).
76. Peck, supra note 57, at 26.
77. Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses, supra note 57, at 1685.
78. Id.
79. "Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamen-
tal than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their dif-
ferences in an orderly predictable manner." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374
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tory system is frustrated by treating the expert solely as the adversary
expert or the court-appointed expert.
The Court-Appointed Expert
Resort to the court-appointed expert relieves many of the concerns
surrounding the use of the adversary expert and has, therefore, been
considered an "equitable and forward-looking technique for promoting
the fair trial of a lawsuit."' 80 It does so, however, at great cost to the
adversary process and the system of trial by jury. The court-appointed
expert, therefore, is not and cannot be a final resolution.8
Court appointment of experts more adequately assures equal ac-
cess to the courts by providing an alternative to litigants who are un-
able to obtain needed expert assistance on their own. However,
because the courts are enpowered to exercise broad discretion in deter-
mining whether to appoint experts, 82 equal access is by no means guar-
anteed. Similarly, early settlement of claims is encouraged where the
court appoints an impartial expert. Exaggerated reports, which inevi-
tably discourage settlement, are deterred with a varying degree of suc-
cess by threatening exposure when the issue is reviewed by the court-
appointed expert. The effect, however, is to transform the 'trial by
jury' into a trial by the court's expert. 83 Moreover, frivolous claims are
not effectively discouraged because court-appointed experts are so
rarely utilized84 they offer no real threat that the adversary expert's
report will be subject to "impartial" evaluation. Finally, the reliability
and credibility of individual expert testimony may improve, but where
competent experts in a field are divided legitimately over an issue, the
search for truth suffers if the adversaries cannot present both sides of
the technical issue.85
(1971). "The concern expressed on this point invites the reminder that a trial is a search for
truth, not a game of chance." Peck, supra note 57, at 25.
80. 31 AM. JUR. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence. § 8, at 502 (1967).
81. Because the court-appointed expert may have an adverse impact on the jury, see
note 83 & accompanying text infra, and the adversary system, see note 92 & accompanying
text infra, the court-appointed expert is intended to be used only when the testimony of the
experts called by the litigants differs greatly. See Peck, supra note 57, at 22-23; Ordover,
Expert Testimony.A4 Proposed Codefor New York, 9 N.Y.L.F. 809, 825, 830 (1974).
82. Courts have wide discretion in determining whether to appoint experts. Scott v.
Spanger Bros., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962) (appointment of "plaintiffs doctor" not error);
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d § 390, 398-402 (1964).
83. Holschuh, supra note 57, at 171-73.
84. Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses, supra note 57, at 1687, 1696 n.78.
85. When legitimate differences exist in the field "then random selection of a suppos-
edly impartial expert may favor that party whose position corresponds to the expert's predi-




The goals of an effective, modem, civil adjudicatory system suffer
far more through use of the adversary expert than through use of the
court-appointed expert. Indeed, the inability of the adversary expert
to satisfy modem judicial needs explains the resurgence of the court's
power to appoint an expert of its own selection.
86
Use of the adversary expert can deny equal access to the courts.
Expert assistance can be very costly and the necessity of paying an ex-
pert's fee can "deny many potential litigants the opportunity to assert
their claims in court."87 Moreover, access may be denied by the in-
ability to compel the attendance of an expert whom the party feels
would provide favorable testimony.8 8 More importantly, however, use
of the adversary expert discourages settlement and encourages frivo-
lous claims. Exaggerated reports by partisan adversary experts dis-
courages settlement by making offers and demands unnecessarily
divergent.8 9 Frivolous claims are encouraged because exaggerated re-
ports often go undetected. 90 Finally, but by no means of least signifi-
cance, the adversary expert may color testimony to best present the
client-litigant's interest.9' Testimonial reliability is undermined,
thereby obstructing the attainment of the ultimate goal-truth.
The Effect of Enacting the Proposed Statute
The proposed statute insures an effective modem civil adjudica-
tory system by preserving the role of the adversary while incorporating
the advantages of the court-appointed expert. It does so by making the
assumption that the expert owes a duty not to any one particular liti-
gant, but to the courts and the public, while at the same time preserving
the adversarial determination of the need for expert evidence. The
parties will continue to select the experts to be summoned.
92
86. "The appointment of disinterested expert witnesses by the Court is one of the ex-
pedients employed for reforming the defects of the partisan system of providing... testi-
mony." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2484, at 270 (3d ed. 1940). See also Peck, supra note
57, at 22-23.
87. Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses, supra note 57, at 1680-81 (cost of expert testi-
mony as a denial of access).
88. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
89. Peck, supra note 58, at 25-27; Holschuh, supra note 58, at 171-72.
90. Holschuh, supra note 57, at 175.
91. Contingent Fees for Expert ttnesses, supra note 57, at 1688-95 (close association
with one party causes expert to consciously or unconsciously modify his or her opinion).
92. "The adversary system is vitally important and should be maintained.... ." Hol-
schuh, supra note 57, at 177. "The choice of experts should be left to the litigants who can
best determine their own interests." Note, Requiring Experts to Testify in Maine, 20 MAINE
L. REv. 297, 303 (1968). The court, moreover, is not equipped to choose an appropriate
expert and often has trouble doing so. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 392 (1964).
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Equal access to the courts is facilitated under the proposal because
the unwillingness of a particular expert to testify would no longer pre-
vent the fair trial on the merits of any action. Litigants will not be
required to secure the consent of the expert by contract before neces-
sary evidence can be obtained.93 Furthermore, the proposal will mini-
mize the effect that the high cost 94 of expert assistance has on access to
the courts. Courts are empowered to consider the litigant's ability to
pay in determining the amount of compensation to be charged. 95
Under court supervision inflation of costs based on the unique expert's
veto power over the proper presentation of evidence on a necessary
element of the litigant's cause of action is removed. Costs conse-
quently will more adequately approximate just compensation. Finally,
the proposal recognizes that the most helpful expert assistance requires
some preparation, examination or inspection before trial and not just
testimony at trial.96 Preparation, examination, and inspection is there-
fore included in the duty owed by the expert to the court and may be
compelled where the court's interest in arriving at a just resolution so
dictates. Equal access to the courts, therefore, is assured under the
proposal by minimizing the effect of costs 97 and the unwilling expert
and by eliminating the possibility that a willing expert who has knowl-
edge necessary to testify on the issue cannot be located.
Achievement of the other three goals of an effective civil adjudica-
tory process is obstructed under the present adversary-expert approach
93. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
94. See Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses, supra note 57, at 1681 n.4 (cost of expert
testimony second only to attorney's fees); Foreman, How to Choose and Use Plaintff's
Experts, 12 FORUM 155, 157 (1976) (aviation expert's normal fee is $400 a day plus
expenses).
95. It is not suggested that the court will act to arbitrarily restrain prices. It is merely
asserted that in those few cases where a litigant is genuinely unable to meet the normal cost
of expert assistance that the court may consider that fact in setting the fees to be charged.
96. "In the realms of medicine, law, science, and many other callings where highly
specialized knowledge is essential, only the most eminent are competent to answer ex
tempore and defend impromtu opinions upon cross-examination ...... Krauschaar Bros.
v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 225, 72 N.E. 2d 165, 166 (1947). Several commentators have
suggested that experts always prepare before testifying, whether compensated or not. "Ex-
perts are always impelled to prepare adequately for trial out of a desire not to appear foolish
in public." Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.: Part One, An Ana tical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 934-35. The proposal,
therefore, would more adequately compensate experts who now may be called to testify
without payment for preparation which is not demanded, but nonetheless performed.
97. An absolute guarantee of access to the courts is not possible. Costs, including that
of the expert, act as a barrier to the poor litigant. One possible solution for the plaintiff who
is unable to pay any amount would be to provide county funds for the initial compensation
of experts. These funds could be reimbursed by the litigant, presumably out of sums even-
tually awarded. The rights of the poor or indigent defendant could be protected by ex-
panded discovery of the opponent's expert. See generally Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of
an Adverse Partys Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962).
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by the partiality of expert reports and testimony resulting from the ex-
pert's close association with the party who pays his or her fee.98 To
prevent the extreme advocacy99 by experts that this agency-like relation
fosters, the proposal provides that all fees would be controlled by the
courts. With the amount of compensation fixed by the courts, experts
would feel less bound to the adversarial role and thus have less incen-
tive to exaggerate. 1°° More objective expert evaluation could result in
less divergent settlement positions and speed the identification of frivo-
lous claims.'01 One may reasonably believe that experts will develop a
sense of responsibility to the courts, rather than to one party, and
thereby the present occurrence of widely divergent opinions will be re-
duced to honest differences in the field. Expert opinion will gain
credibility.
By assuring the achievement of the goals necessary to an effective
civil adjudicatory system the proposal protects the interests of both the
court and litigants. The proposal, however, also minimizes the imposi-
tion on the rights and interests of the expert: 1) the right to reasonable
compensation for services performed; 2) the right to exercise freedom
of choice; and 3) the right to be free from undue infringement or
harassment.
Reasonable compensation is guaranteed the expert under the pro-
posal. Just compensation is assured for services rendered, and witness
fees in excess of those provided the ordinary witness are available.
The proposal would in many jurisdictions more adequately protect the
expert in this regard than present law.10 2 Experts required to testify
for ordinary witness fees as to opinions previously formed invariably
98. See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
99. It is not contended that the majority of experts actually perjure themselves to in-
crease the amount of compensation they will receive, but merely that an expert develops a
sense of responsibility to his or her employer, the litigant, encouraging unduly favorable
testimony. See Holschuh, supra note 57, at 170-71; Note, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 603, 611-13
(1977); Peck, supra note 57, at 22 (stating: "Under present procedure, where the medical
testimony comes from no objective or necessarily qualified source, and only through the
hirelings of the parties, partisan experts, medical mouthpieces, the jury is more apt to be
confused than enlightened by what it hears."). See also Crutchfield v. Davidson Brick Co.,
55 Cal. App. 2d 34, 37-38, 130 P.2d 183, 185 (1942) (recognizing that large sums are a temp-
tation to color testimony).
100. Even under the proposed statute all incentive for excessively partisan testimony is
not removed. Experts who wish to be called again and again by counsel will continue to
slant their reports and testimony to please their employers. With court control of compen-
sation that kind of continuous relationship would be the only prime target for impeachment
on cross-examination.
101. By encouraging more honest, accurate expert analysis of the case, each party's bar-
gaining position will be better defined and presumably more realistic, thereby facilitating
settlement.
102. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
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must prepare before testifying. 0 3 Enactment of the proposal would
guarantee compensation for all services.
The expert's claim to witness fees in excess of those provided the
ordinary witness, however, is debatable. °4 When experts actually tes-
tify they perform a duty practically indistinguishable from the ordinary
witness, a duty for which the government is not required to pay. The
fees provided by subsection (ii) of the proposal are, consequently, in-
tended only to be nominal. The greater fees provided the expert wit-
ness simply recognizes the possible frequency of the imposition on the
expert, 10 5 the expert's investment in his or her knowledge, and the earn-
ing potential of the expert's time. 0 6 In contrast, the compensation
provided by subsection (iii) of the proposal is intended to fully com-
pensate the expert. When preparation, examination or investigation is
required the expert is truly unlike the ordinary witness and is perform-
ing a service which requires reasonable compensation.
The expert's freedom of choice and the resulting willingness or un-
willingness to perform is protected under the proposal by the require-
ment that the expert may be compelled only when deemed necessary
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Judge Friendly, in writ-
ing for the second circuit in Kaufman v. Edelstein,10 7 suggested:
Appropriate factors for consideration-some pointing against a dis-
pensation and some for one-would be the degree to which the ex-
pert is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the
case rather than in order to give opinion testimony; the difference
between testifying to a previously formed or expressed opinion and
forming a new one; the possibility that, for other reasons, the witness
is a unique expert; the extent to which the calling party is able to
show the unlikelihood that any comparable witness will willingly tes-
tify; the degree to which the witness is able to show that he has been
oppressed by having continually to testify; and, undoubtedly, many
others.' 0
8
Furthermore, the problem of the unwilling expert might not be as
severe under the proposed statute as under present practice. Experts
with the highest qualifications who typically would be unwilling to ap-
103. See note 96 supra.
104. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2203.
105. "Thus, the most eminent physician might be compelled, merely for the ordinary
witness fees, to attend from the remotest part of the district, and give his opinion in every
trial in which a medical question should arise. Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1, 6 (1877). See
also Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 935.
106. The greater value of an expert's time is strongly contested by Wigmore. 8 WIG-
MORE, supra note 9, § 2203.
107. 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 822. See also Note, Compelling Experts to Testify: A Proposal, 44 U. CHI. L.




pear in the partisan role might readily "respond to a call from the court
as a public and professional duty." 109  This possibility seems even
more likely under the proposed statute, whereby reasonable compensa-
tion for any services rendered would be guaranteed. Practical ele-
ments of the adversary system will also minimize the imposition on the
expert. Counsel will only seek the assistance of an unwilling and prob-
ably hostile expert when either the testimony of a willing expert is un-
available or the unwilling expert's opinion is somehow unique.
The same factors which minimize the imposition on the expert's
freedom of choice would operate to insure that no particular expert
would suffer excessive imposition or harassment. Furthermore, once
the duty to testify is recognized, courts can fashion rules and doctrines
designed exclusively to alleviate any inequities that might arise as a
result of extending the scope of compulsory process.110
The Constitutionality of the Proposed Statute
Recognizing that the proposal merely minimizes the imposition on
the expert's rights and interests rather than absolutely protecting those
rights may give rise to constitutional objections. The proposed statute,
however, may withstand constitutional attack by virtue of the compen-
sation provisions and the nature of the duty imposed. By guaranteeing
compensation for any services which may be required and fees for any
testimony given, the statute avoids violating the due process clause of
either the fifth or the fourteenth amendments,11 even in those jurisdic-
tions which adhere to the property concept of an expert's knowledge or
opinion. 1" 2 The compensation provisions of the statute do not, how-
ever, dispel the possibility of a violation of the thirteenth amendment's
prohibition of involuntary servitude. "Compensation for service may
cause consent, but unless it does it is no justification for forced
labor." 11
3
109. Peck, supra note 57, at 26.
110. Once the expert is freed from the confines of rules designed to regulate the ordinary
witness, rules addressed to the unique problems of the expert, such as the possibility of
having constantly to appear, could be promulgated. For instance, modem techniques of
visual and audio recording and transmission may offer an alternative to the need for time-
consuming personal appearances. See Note, 42 Mo. L. REv. 121, 122 (1977).
111. The language of the Supreme Court in Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588
(1973), discussing the validity of incarceration of a material witness to a criminal action, is
instructive: "The Fifth Amendment does not require that the Government pay for the per-
formance of a public duty it is already owed."
112. In those jurisdictions which adhere to the property theory of an expert's knowledge
or opinion, however, the compensation provisions are required. By virtue of the guaranteed
compensation constitutional dilemmas are avoided. See In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156
S.E. 791 (1931).
113. Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798,799 (5th Cir. 1944) (conscientious objector ordered
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An unwilling expert, compelled to prepare, examine, or investigate
the facts of a case in order to form an opinion which would be useful to
the court could allege a violation of the thirteenth amendment. "The
answer [to such an allegation, however] lies in the broad principle that
the thirteenth amendment has no application to a call for service made
by one's government according to law to meet a public need ....
The same fundamental assumption, the duty to testify, therefore, en-
ables the proposal to withstand all constitutional attack.11 5 If the un-
derlying assumption is sound, that the expert owes a duty to the public
when expert evidence is necessary to the proper administration of jus-
tice, then allegations of constitutional violations may be rejected.
Conclusion
The continuing controversy surrounding the role of the expert wit-
ness in civil litigation is a manifestation of the inability of present-day
rules and doctrines, designed to govern the ordinary witness, to address
adequately problems which are unique to the expert. Resolution of the
controversy has been inordinately hampered by the issue of
compensation.
The idea that the ordinary witness was once beyond the power of
the courts to compel seems archaic today. In years to come, when the
role of the expert witness is commonly accepted, the idea that the
courts today permit expert testimony to be bought and sold will seem
equally primitive. This Note has attempted to demonstrate that reso-
lution of the controversy simply awaits the realization that the expert
owes a duty to the courts and to the public and not to any one litigant.
That realization, in turn, is founded on the recognition of the public
need for the unbiased assistance of experts in an effective modern civil
adjudicatory system. If that public need is not now apparent, as it
should be, it will become apparent as the number and types of highly
technical, legal, and factual issues multiply with the ever increasing
complexity of society.
to perform alternative service not protected by Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against
involuntary servitude).
114. Id.
115. In a long line of cases the Supreme Court has upheld governmental imposition on
the liberty of citizens where a public need is served. See, e.g., Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328
(1916) (requiring able-bodied men to work on the roads not in violation of the thirteenth
amendment); Klubnikin v. United States, 227 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
975 (1956); O'Connor v. United States, 415 F.2d 1110 (1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 968
(1970) (upholding the alternative service provision of the Selective Service Act). See also
Misner & Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 713, 717-25 (1977) (providing an overview of the thirteenth amendment).
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